Thesis Belonging Essay Example

Thesis Belonging Essay Thesis Statements for Belonging RBelonging can be created, supported or broken by RELATIONSHIPS UOnly through UNDERSTANDING can an individual, group or community find a connection. GJUDGEMENTS or choices that individuals make may create or destroy a sense of belonging. An individual may choose whether to/or not to belong. BIndividuals (or a group) may encounter BARRIERS to belonging IAn individual’s (or collective) IDENTITY and self-perception may develop through the process of belonging. Only the individual can determine whether or not he/she belongs and this will in turn shape a sense of self. PBelonging is a PERCEPTION. Perceptions shape the way that an author, character or responder may feel in relation to belonging. It is important to remember that context shapes perception. An individual or group may feel that they belong to a PLACE or landscape. AATTITUDES about belonging may evolve and change over time IINDIVIDUALITY. Each unique individual has the potential to enrich the community and foster a greater sense of belonging. An individual may belong to an IDEA or IDEOLOGY including religious, political or cultural ideologies. NBelonging may be understood as an instinctive NEEDof humanity Examples Our individual identity is greatly constructed by how others perceive us. As members of society we all actively desire the respect, and friendship of our peers. An individual’s fear of alienation can lead them to think or act in ways that are not true to their ideology. Belonging to a social group builds character and identity. We will write a custom essay sample on Thesis Belonging specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Thesis Belonging specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Thesis Belonging specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer Contrastingly, alienation forces one to ask why they are alone and thus the strength of identity is challenged. To truly belong to a group one must surrender all conflicting thoughts and ideologies. As social group, along with your family, dictates the morals you come to respect. These greatly impact who you are. Alienation does not make us stronger, all it achieves is a disconcerting feeling of being unwanted and rejected. Throughout childhood and adolescence, we observe our parents and peers morals and ideologies, and use this to construct identity. The community surrounding you impacts your opinion of selfhood, consequently moulding your identity. Being educated on your family’s past wrong doings, can lead to you developing a strong sense of identity that purposefully avoids repeating such errors. An individual who is a member of a social group has a greater chance of maintaining their individuality. This is in contrast to an alienated and disconnected person. When in a similar social group, an individual’s identity is perceived as stronger. A strong sense of identity is dependant on family and social standing in the community. A sense of identity depends on social interaction within family and community members. John’s sense of identity is dependant on his perception of the group to which he belongs; the police force. When people don’t belong to a group, they have difficulty in establishing a sense of self. Belonging to a family strengthens the belief you have in who you are and what you stand for. Identity is made up of the people surrounding you. In order to have an identity, one must first belong to a group.

artificial creation essays

artificial creation essays The word Artificial, derived from the Latin word artificialis is defined as Made by humans; produced rather than natural. Since the beginning of time man has always been enthralled by a magnificent sight; however what is beautiful to one person may be uncanny to another. This thought can be summed up in one sentence: Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. This saying was formulated many years ago, and it still holds true today. Throughout time, man has striven to find and become beautiful. In the stories of Ovid, Pynchon, Kleist, and Blade Runner, this is the case. In these stories, however, the same concept is presented in the form of a question: Is it acceptable to become beautiful through artificial means? In each of the four stories, the same idea is presented in different contexts. Ovid, Kleist and Blade Runner build figures from the ground up to create what they think to be perfect creatures. Pynchon, however, while still using a form of creation merely re-creates shape s on the face of a young girl to obtain what she thinks is a better suited nose. The only natural creation is Gods. Throughout time, man has striven for perfection. With more and more technological advances, it has become possible to create the person that everyone idolizes. In the case of Pynchon, for instance, a nose job to achieve what Esther believes will make her truly beautiful is the topic. Doctor Shoenmaker, who is performing the surgery, is more than a doctor. The doctor turns a rather normal surgery into some kind of sexual fiesta with perverted antidotes. After achieving what Esther thinks is personal beauty, she willingly gives herself to her creator, Doctor Shoenmaker, in full confidence. Doctor Shoenmaker on the other hand, believes that in turning Esther into what she wants to become, he has now somehow transformed this hideous beast into some kind of beautiful temptress and the she should...

The Normal Pathways How Glycogen Made and Broke Down Essay

The Normal Pathways How Glycogen Made and Broke Down - Essay Example Glycogen synthesis which is also known as glycogenesis involves the addition of glucose molecules onto glycogen for the storage purposes. The process takes place in the liver, from where the activation is done by insulin, the hormone responsible for lowering blood sugar levels, in instances of high glucose levels. The process is a two-step process involving various enzymes that play significant roles in catalyzing the process. The first step in glycogen synthesis is the process involving phosphorylation of glucose to form glucose-6-phosphate (G6P). The process is a phosphorylation process and is acted upon by an enzyme named hexokinase or glucokinase. This involves the addition of a phosphate molecule onto the glucose on the sixth carbon atom resulting into the formation of Glucose-6-Phospahete (Hers, 1970). From the action of Phosphoglucomutase enzyme on Glucose-6-Phospahte, an intermediary of glucose-1, 6-bisphosphate is formed, but this is usually temporary, after which it is late r converted to glucose-1-phosphate. The phosphoglucomutase enzyme involved in the above reaction, acts to transfer the phosphate group to and from the alpha 1 carbon to the alpha 6 carbon glucose molecule respectively. The formed glucose-1-phosphate then undergoes certain chain of intermediate reactions that change it to Uridyl Diphosphate-glucose complex (UDP-glucose complex). This happens in the presence of Uridyl Triphosphate, in which one molecule of phosphate is released to form pyrophosphate. The process resulting into the formation of the UDP-glucose complex usually occurs as a result of the action of Uridyl Transferase which in certain cases is called UDP-glucose pyrophosphorylase. At this point, through the activation by insulin, glycogen synthase gets grip of the glucose molecule from the complex and attaches it to glycogen, the form in which it is stored (Halse, 2000). In the glycogen synthase catalyzed reaction, the carbon number 1 of Uridyl Diphosphate-glucose complex a ttaches to the carbon number 4 of the non-reducing end of the glycogen chain, from where the glucose molecule from the Uridyl Diphosphate-glucose complex to attach it to the glycogen chain. This process is considered to be genetically stable as during the reaction, the Uridyl triphosphate is converted to Uridyl Diphosphate, thereby releasing energy in the form of UTP (Hers, 1970). The whole process is considered reversible as in instances, in which the body’s glucose levels go down, the body is able to initiate the breakdown of glycogen molecules to form glucose through the process of glycogen metabolism. Glycogen metabolism and synthesis are considered to be regulatory processes in the body for creation of a balance in the body’s blood glucose levels (Newgard, 1989). After intake of meals heavy in glucose, the blood glucose levels rise, a stimulating factor to glycogen synthesis in the liver. This would then result into the conversion of the glucose molecules to glyco gen molecules which are then stored for future use. The reverse is also true in instances in which blood glucose levels go down. The body is again able to activate the breakdown of glycogen to form glucose. Regulation and control of glycogen synthesis is an almost similar to the aspects discussed above, only that in this perspective, in-depth analysis is established. Three hormones play a substantive role in ensuring that control and balances are

Different approaches to performance management Essay

Different approaches to performance management - Essay Example Performance management is using by countries such GDP, organizations and individuals. Performance management is troubled to get the best performance from person, but goes extra in that it also aspire to get the best performance from the team and from the organization as an entire (R. Wayne Mondy). Performance management derives from the human resource management approach as a strategic and incorporated approach to the management and growth of people. The procedure of recognize, evaluating and mounting the work performance of employees in the organization, so that the organizational purpose and objectives are more efficiently achieved, while at the similar time benefiting employees in terms of credit, receiving feedback, catering for labor needs and offering career leadership. This definition emphasizes that performance management is a procedure. We can see the exemplify following: From this definition, we can believe that performance management is worried by means of humanizing not only the performance of the individual, but also the performance of the team and the organization. ... gnificant thing of performance management is set up a system in which individuals and groups take blame for the continuous development of commerce processes, and of their own skills and contributions. 2.2 The Objectives of Performance Management System 2.2.1 Discrimination A manager must try to discriminate objectively between those who are contributing to the achievement of the organization's objectives and those who are not. In other word, a manager must be talented to appraisal an individual's past performance and assess strengths, level of effort and areas to reward and expand subordinates. Here the focal point is on what the employee has really done in the past, and an effort is made to build on the employee's strengths and make development in other areas so that the employee can carry out more efficiently in the future (Dessler, 1999). 2.2.2 Reward For performance to be encouraged, rewards are necessary. When a managers reward a part of subordinates for their past work, other subordinate will recognized they must work harder in the future. Reward is also a useful tool for motivate employees, suing a system like performance-related pay, to best performance at work. 2.2.3 Development The third objective of the performance management is growth. It includes expand person, term and organization. Performance management as a system concerns not only just for the past, but also for the future. When employees reach their full potential, the organization can also benefit fully from their abilities and contributions (Arthur Sherman, 1998, p.323). 2.2.4 Communication As a two ways system, performance management can also construct a kind of feedback flanked by employees and managers. Employee communiqu is a basic part in the system. It is because an effectual performance

Module 9 Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Module 9 - Essay Example The plants often used in these designs are stylized versions of the acanthus, with emphasis on the leafy forms, the vine, and the twining stems. It is claimed that arabesque is used for its theological significance, but there are no documents validating this, probably because of the ancient origins of the design. The intricacy of the arabesque reflects the Islamic world view: the repetitive, mathematically precise patterns of foliage and geometric designs signify infinity that extends beyond the visible material world. Its infinite patterns symbolize the perfect nature of the creation of the one God (Arabesque, 2007). The mathematical and exacting complexity of the design creates a visual appeal that may be read within the context of the philosophical, theological and political discourses on God’s nature and that of the universe (Campo, 2009). There are some writers, however, who are convinced that since the Arabesque style preceded Islam, its value in Islamic architecture and art are little more than ornamental, with little implication on the Islamic world view (Brill, 1987). References Arabesque (23 January 2007) ‘The meaning of Arabesque’. Retrieved 15 October 2012 from http://arabesqueflair.blogspot.com/2007/01/arabesque-is-element-of-islamic-art.html Brill, E.J. (1987) Brill’s First Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1913-1936. ... wiki/File:Sheikh_Lotf_Allah_Mosque.jpg Video Review: Arabic Architecture Part 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGZAuMJqYag The video on Arabic Architecture did not have any narrative, but provided a unique experience with breathtaking sites and exotic music. The video showed scenes of Islamic mosques and their surrounding courtyards, characterized by domes and minarets. The arabesque inlays in the panels and ceilings complemented the repeating arches that capture a geometric exactness that conveyed infinite perfection. The majesty of the architecture was well highlighted in the grand structures and rich artwork. More surprisingly, however, the same exotic architecture was shown in the common areas such as sidewalks where vendors sell their wares and pedestrians hurry about their business. In these places, the colors may be a bit more worn, nevertheless the hint of grandeur remains in the form of arches and arabesque designs in the ceilings and posts. Many of the mosques and palatial structures are reportedly from as early as the 8th century, a testament to the longevity and universality of the artwork as well as the durability of the structure. However, included in the video are pictures of the more modern buildings such as Malaysia’s Petronas Twin Towers. Looking every inch the modern high rise building that it is, the cross-sectional design of the towers make use of the geometric patterns used in the more ancient Islamic architectural works. In many of the buildings, a clear continuity with the surrounding natural environment helps to enhance the beauty of the buildings at night as well as during the day. Locating the structure over or close to a body of water allows for the reflection to extend the image and underscore the repetitiveness and continuity of the

The role of the European Parliament

The role of the European Parliament INTRODUCTION The division of powers among an executive, a legislature and a judiciary (Montesquieus tripartite system, The Spirit of Laws, 1748) is the common feature of the national democratic systems. The Parliament/National Assembly as a voice of the people can be considered as the institution that legitimizes system as a whole. Every country has its own parliamentary system, recognized and identified by the citizens. The European Parliament as the EU level legislature was created on the model of its counterparts. However its perception is significantly different. One can compare the internal organization of both, national and European Parliament, status of their members or party system but what undermines all the comparisons is the context in which these bodies are placed. The role of the European Parliament is determined by the nature of the EU and its sui generis character ‘a political system on its own right. It decides on the role of the institutions, division of competences and in ter-institutional relations that differ from those at the national level. Lack of traditional government has a significant impact on the position of the European political parties within the system. There is no executive to identify with nor to oppose to. The European party system is based on two competing principals that posses different resources to shape behavior of ‘their MEPs [agents]- national parties and the European political parties. EU is very often contested because of the lack of the legitimacy. The importance of the European elections is diminished because of the lack of electoral connection with the public and dominance of the national issues (second order elections). The internal procedures as well as decision making process are too complex to be entirely understood by an average citizen. As a consequence there is a different environment for the parties to operate in at the national and the EU level. It generates diverse level of cohesiveness, abilities to control, sanctions and rewards. All these factors decide on the way political parties organize at each level collectively or individually and what are the incentives that determine their choice. Are they in fact weaker in the European Parliament if compares to those in the domestic parliaments in Europe? If it is the case what are the main reasons that make them weaker? Which of the lsquo;principals has more influence? I will argue that due to the different constitutional structure of the EU lack of government performance of the European parties is less apparent than those at the national level. As a consequence the incentives for collective party organization can be indeed considered weaker than it is a case for the domestic parliaments. However evaluation of these incentives cannot be oversimplified. These two levels are interlinked and mutually dependent. Growing cohesiveness within the political groups can be a merit of both: national and European party levels. Importance of the EP (especially after the Lisbon Treaty) draws more and more attention to what does happen in the EP. Its growing power provides national parties with additional incentives to organize collectively at the supra-domestic level in order to maximize effectiveness of their actions. Firstly I will emphasize the main features of the European party system, its structure, mechanisms and levels of collective organization. The first part will be divided in two sections: brief presentation of the nomenclature used in the context of the European parliamentary system and theory of two principals the system is based on. Secondly I will present common incentives for collective party organization, that can be found at both levels. In the third part, I will focus on European dimension of these incentives. Forth part will contain a comparative analysis of two levels: national and European presenting the main differences. Given to the information, presented in the prior chapters, in the fifth one, I will answer what determines voting behavior of the MEPs and internal-party cohesiveness. In the last, sixth part, I will come to concluding statements. I. EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND MECHANISMS Structure of the party system in the European Parliament is characterized by its multiplicity of organization levels and actors involved. First of all there are national party delegations which join the European political parties (transnational parties or Europarties) which then create European political groups. These two first levels may result in third although less official one at which political groups cooperate together in order to minimize the influence of other political groups or to build a common front against the other EU institutions such as the Council or the European Commission. Thus one could describe internal organization of the European Parliament as two and a half or three level transnational party system (see Figure 1.1). I.1. DEFINITIONS The European party system is characterized by the complexity of nomenclature which needs to be clarified in order to understand the party organization. Starting from the first component of the structure. National party delegations can be defined as entities within the transnational parties in the EP consisting of MEPs from the same national party. Transnational parties are the group [s] of representatives within a given institution that typically come from the same party family. According to Lindberg et al., in the EP, these transnational parties are also commonly referred to as (transnational) party groups. However, it has to be mentioned that these transnational parties, albeit they create transnational political groups, they are not the equivalent of the latter. In most cases political groups are composed of more than one political party. Not every MEPs belongs to the party that creates the group unaffiliated members. Political groups are not allowed to take part in the campaign for the European elections and cannot be established if the proposed membership consists of MEPs from only one member state. Functioning and organization of the European parties has its legal basis in the Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding. I.2. TWO PRINCIPALS THEORY The principal-agent theory is frequently used by the scholars to describe the relations among the actors involved in the EU policy-making process, namely: institutions and members states. The central problem analyzed [in this theory] is that one actor (the principal) needs to delegate tasks and resources to another actor (the agent) who will take action on behalf of the principal but who has interests and objectives of his or her own. Agent cannot observe the actions of its principal, thus its control abilities are very limited. It creates a serious incentive problem and a necessity of the sanction mechanism to ensure expected outcomes. Principal-agent interaction applies also to the European Parliament. There are two party principals that possess specific resources to shape the behavior of their MEPs. Quality of these resources determines the influence and efficiency of the principals. National parties (principal 1) can use their control of candidate reselection and their control of the process of European elections to influence whether an MEP is elected to the parliament in the first place. European parties (principal 2), in turn, can use their control of resources and power inside the parliament to influence whether an MEP is able to secure his or her policy and career goals once elected. What does the two-principal theory mean for the effectiveness of the European party system? What does it say about the interactions within the system? According to David Marquand, European party system, in order to be fully democratic and effective has to be based on Europe des partis where politics is structured through a party system, and not on Europe des patries where politics is structured around national identities and governments. It would guarantee a higher level of internal cohesiveness and secure the policy objectives. In the European Parliament, there is however a significant pressure from the national parties which may have a strong impact on the final decisions of one MEP or another. When the power of the EP is at stake, MEPs have strong incentive to vote together to acquire more power relative to other EU institutions , to ensure a counterbalance. However, the national parties may be encouraged to exert more influence over their MEPs because of the growing legislative power of the EP. Hence, it can be argued that there will be an increased intervention by national parties to control the activities of their European re presentatives. The functioning of the EP depends to a great extent on the interactions between two principals and the influence of one or/and the other. These interactions are, in turn, determined by a lot of factors. Among the others one can mention: issue covered, circumstances, institutional context and strategies applied by the particular groups. Different incentives offered by them evoke different behavior. Incentives for collective party organization can be common for both levels: national and European, separate or may create a sort of   toolbox of the incentives that are taken out of the box, when there is such a need. II. COMMON INCENTIVES FOR COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION Collective organization is one of the concept which can be applied to a lot of spheres of political and social science. It refers to the logic of collective action of Mancur Olson and its theory of groups. The main purpose of the collective organization is to reduce transaction costs of what can be achieved by joining the group whose members share the same interests. The most evident form of collective organization in political parties context is the coalition-building. According to John H. Aldrich, political parties are institutional solutions created by rational utility-maximizing legislators to reduce the transaction costs of collective decision-making and solve the internal collective action problems they face in the legislature. There are two main common incentives for collective organization: reduction of transaction costs and solution for collective action problem. Building a coalition is a very time-consuming and demanding process that includes the costs of putting together a proposal, identifying coalition partners and forging a compromise acceptable to a sufficient majority. Going through all these stages every time a party looks for an ally is too risky and does not guarantee sufficient level of influence after all. The existence of political parties reduces these costs by allowing the actors concerned to ‘pre-pack like-minded legislators and form more stable coalition patterns. Coalition-building solves also the problem of collective action in decision making process. Through organizing themselves into a majority party, legislators can receive a higher pay-off in terms of policy then they could achieve as individual legislators. Being a part of a majoritarian coalition is the only way to have enough influence in order to pass a legislation that would secure the policy objectives. Every coalition, once built, has to be cohesive, otherwise it will not play its expected role. Voting behavior of the coalition members determines its power and effectiveness. Transnational character of the political groups, however, can easily impede the internal cohesiveness. There two groups of the reasons that can be mentioned. First one, having its sources in systemic differences as to the political culture, traditions, habits, mentalities, political scene stability (bi- or multipolar), level of dependence on national authorities, attachment to domestic parties, importance of national issues etc. Second one concerning individual features such as personality, knowledge about the issues concerned, language barrier which can hinder the access to informal source of information as well as the informal inter-MEPs relations. The list of the reasons is not exhaustive one. It shows, however, the importance and influence of the national system on the behavior of the MEPs who have been brought up by each particular system. The question arises what can be done in order to ensure a satisfactory level of cohesiveness? What are the instruments that can be used to control voting behavior? The EU party system does not have such an advanced sanction mechanism as it is the case in the domestic parliaments in Europe. Therefore, establishing party leadership seems to be the most effective, if not the only one, solution to compensate this deficiency. There are two possible scenarios that can be applied by the parties. According to the first one, parties can establish a transnational party together with like-minded legislators in order to reduce transaction costs of legislative decision-making. There is no centralized party group leadership and collective action problem of maintaining party unity can be solved through repeated actions. Alternative option assumes the establishment of party group leadership with monitoring capabilities and disciplinary power. These two scenarios give the legislators incentives to fo rm transnational parties at the European level in order to increase their influence over policy outcomes. Apart from having influence on policy-making ‘policy seeking incentive, scholars distinguish two others: ‘re-election and ‘office-seeking. Together, they form a sort of the incentives triangle which defines the collective party organization (see Figure 2.1). It depends on the particular system which incentive is more likely to be used. In the domestic parliamentary system ‘re-election is particularly important one due to a great impact of national parties on future career of their MEPs. It has to be born in mind, that this incentives triangle is characterized by mutual dependence on the one hand and inequality on the other. According Thorsten Faas, their relations can be described ‘clear lexicographic order. He underlines importance of re-election goal as the one that decide on the existence of the two others. ‘Without re-election, there is neither office, nor policy. It confirms the importance of the domestic parliamentary system and preliminary incentive it offers. Once, however, re-election is achieved, it creates further incentives that can be applied at the EU level. III. INCENTIVES FOR COLLECTIVE PARTY ORGANIZATION AT THE EU LEVEL ‘Transnational parties are (†¦) a product of national parties, who created and sustain the transnational parties to serve their own policy goals in the European Parliament. Thus, it is in the national parties interest to ensure the cohesiveness in once created supranational platform. ‘Each national party is unlikely to obtain its policy objectives by acting alone. They need an access to transnational level which would open a ‘window of opportunity through which they could pass their goals. Transnational parties ‘help national parties and MEPs, structure their behavior. These two levels of party organization are characterized by interdependence based on mutuality of interests and benefits. National party as an essential subcomponent of transnational party on the one hand. Transnational party as a useful platform and a source of behavior structure on the other. Apart from these inter-related incentives, falling partially in Principal 1 and Principal 2 resources, one can mention other, reserved only for MEPs once they have been elected (See: II.2. Two principal theory; Principal 2). The most important one is allocation of leadership position within the EP. Party groups ‘control important assets within the EP such as committee positions, rapporteurships for writing legislative reports, and plenary speaking time. ‘The most salient reports are allocated to the most loyal MEPs. Another incentive, however less important, is the control of the parliamentary agenda by the MEPs. They do have an influence on what can be included in the agenda, but they cannot decide on whether one issue or another can be kept of the agenda. The larger party group is, the greater influence on allocation of leadership position and agenda control it has. Using the allocation position power as well as (limited) agenda control one can argue that European poli tical groups are able to ‘enforce party line and mobilize its members to unified voting. While analyzing incentives for collective party organization at the EU level, institutional context has to be mentioned. Behavior of the institutions and their members is to a great extent determined by inter-institutional competition. Each of them seeks to preserve its position on the institutional arena and ensure its influence on the issues concerned. In other words, the inter-institutional competition system is based on counterbalance mechanisms that help the institutions prevent the dominant position of one of them. This is the case also for the European Parliament, whose power has been systematically enforcing by the treaties, moving the EP form its position of purely consultative body (Treaty of Rome) and to the one of an active player the decision-making process (veto power). The ordinary legislative procedure introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, entered into a force in 2009, makes the role of the EP even more significant. Collective organization within the EP as well as voting c ohesiveness help the EP to reduce the importance of two other institutions, namely the Council and the Commission. Another level of the competition which is very present in the EP concern party groups. Inter-party group competition determines voting behavior within the groups increasing cohesiveness. It is in the interest of the political groups to ensure a strong position vis à   vis other groups. Following the general rule bigger can more, creating bigger and more influential platform enables the groups to be more competitive and to constitute a counterbalance to the others. As S. Hix et al. argue, ‘the incentive to form and maintain powerful transnational party organization is fundamentally related to political competition inside the European Parliament (†¦) It pays to be cohesive because this increases a partys chance of being on the winning side of a vote and thus to influence its final outcome. IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INCENTIVES IN DOMESTIC PARLIAMENTS IN EUROPE AND IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Among the consequences of the distinct nature of the nation state on the one hand and the European Union on the other (see: Introduction, pp. 1-2) one can find differences between incentives for collective party organization accessible at both levels. The reasons maybe divided into groups which touch upon different aspects: nature of the European election, re-election capabilities, sanction instruments, constitutional structure and general perception of political parties performance at both levels. Domestic parliaments are perceived as the ones that offer their deputies more incentives than it is the case of the European Parliament, where ‘the role of the political parties is much less apparent.Reif and Schmitt coined the term of ‘second-order national elections to underline the importance of the national issues in the election campaigns in Europe. One can also mention very low turnout, ‘weak electoral connection between citizens and European legislators, no ‘brand name at the EU level ‘since candidates do not use a common European label, but the label of their national party. Taking into account these factors, ‘the nature of elections does not [seem to] provide an incentive to act within a cohesive party group that is as strong as in genuine national election. Internal functioning of the EP shows an important role played by the national electoral systems as well as strong a ‘connection between the MEPs and their national parties. The national parties constitute ‘the main aggregate actors in the European Parliament. There are lots of aspects justifying this statement. These are the national parties that nominate the candidates to the European elections. They decide also ‘which of their MEPs will be returned to the European Parliament. ‘National party leaderships have a dominant influence on the future career prospects of the MEPs, both within and beyond the EP. National parties decide which of their MEPs they will support for key committee position and offices inside the parliament and also whether MEPs will be chosen as candidates for national legislative and executive office. There is a clear list of incentives and goal that may be achieved. The most important one is ‘re-election. The lack of this particular incentive to offer at the EU level weakens significantly the position of transnational parties in comparison to their national counterparts. Level of the voting cohesiveness determines the effectiveness of the transnational groups once they are established. It decides if they are able or not to ‘ensure political accountability and consistent decision-making.Domestic parliamentary systems have at their disposal greater sanctions for the behavior contradictory to the party lines. Taking into account what national parties can offer, there is too much to lose if one decide not follow their instructions (cost and benefits analysis). One of the relevant instruments available at the domestic level is the confidence vote attached to a legislative proposal. It can be used by the governmental party or coalition in order to ensure (party) voting cohesion.On top of that, ‘the cabinet, with its prerogatives in the legislative process, is formed along partisan lines and the portfolios are distributed by party leaders. It shows that political parties ‘are crucial at all stages of the making of public policy. The sanctions mechanism within the European Parliament is developed enough to exert an effective influence on voting behavior of the MEPs. There are two instruments which has to be mentioned. Political groups can control their members through ‘whips or by ‘group coordinators in case of the committees. The second one at the disposal of the political groups is ‘the ultimate sanction of expelling an individual MEP or national party delegation from the group. However, political groups make use of this possibility only in extreme cases.Decision of the expulsion ‘has to be supported by a majority of all MEPs in the group and is only credible if expelling the party would not weaken the political group compared with its opponents in the parliament.Importance of the available instruments is limited by their rather theoretical dimension. If we assume that the transnational parties are responsible for the growing cohesiveness within the political groups, the threat of us e of the sanction itself should be sufficient in order to ensure an obedience of the MEPs. However, if these are the national parties which determine the voting behavior, these sanction instruments lose their raison dà ªtre and should be regarded as rather simple provision. Differences between two levels concern to a large extent the constitutional structure. The one of the EU ‘does not (†¦) resemble the structure of a parliamentary system.First of all, there is no traditional government to support, discredit, refer to: identify with or oppose to. No executive ‘which can enforce party unity via a vote of confidence.Only possibility at the EPs disposal is ‘the power to vote the European executive (the Commission) through vote of no confidence. However, the necessary majority (two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the component MEPs, art. 234 TFEU) is very difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the Commission ‘[is not] recruited from a majority coalition within the EP.It has no power to dissolve the Parliament, even for the budgets rejection which would normally have happened in the national systems. One can say that both positive and negative incentives from the part of the ‘executive are very li mited. Nothing to be afraid of and nothing to strive for. Performance of European political groups is weakened by limited abilities of agenda control (in comparison to the domestic parliaments). ‘No transnational party can use agenda control powers in order to keep policy issues which divide the party from arising in the legislative decision-making process (†¦) even if [this particular party holds] a sufficient majority of votes'(see Section III, p. 7). It is the European Commission that has an exclusive right to initiative. The European Parliament can only submit the proposal for legislative act, which then is considered by the Commission. The same applies to the transnational parties in the Council. Thus, Lindberg et al., argue that ‘partisan control of the legislative agenda is only possible if a political camp dominates all three legislative bodies in the EU, namely: the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Table 1 Party effects on legislative decision-making National parties Transnational parties Electoral arena Selection of representatives European Parliament Yes No Council Yes No Commission Yes No Legislative arena Legislative organization European Parliament Mixed Mixed Council No No Commission No No Intra-institutional decision-making European Parliament Yes Yes Council Mixed Mixed Commission No No Intra-institutional decision-making Mixed Yes (preliminary evidence) Source: B. Lindberg, A. Rasmussen, A. Warntjen, ‘Party politics as usual? The role of political parties in EU legislative decision-making, Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 15, Issue 8, 2008, p. 1114. V. DETERMINANTS OF THE VOTING COHESIVENESS INSIDE THE EP Different factors that determine the voting behavior inside the EP refer us to the theory of two principals mentioned in the second part (see pages 3-4). Which of them has a greater impact on how the MEPs vote: national parties of transnational groups? What does prevail: national loyalty or partisan alignments? Do they necessarily oppose to each other? One can assume that MEPs take their decision being well informed and fully aware of the context of the decisions, their content as well as their consequences. However, a significant part of them are being taken without this knowledge and rationally based analysis. Instead of it, other factors influence the MEPs and their final decision. Three of them seem to be the most important. First, personal relations among the MEPs established as a result of socialization. It concerns especially those first-time elected deputies who are not very familiar with organizational structure of the EP. They are often forced to rely on somebody else while taking the decision. Somebody who, for different reasons, they decide to trust while taking decision. Second, content of the issue discussed and its impact on a vote. If the outcome of the decision is particularly important from a countrys perspective, one could expect that MEP to be well informed about the issue. Then probability that he or she will vote in accordance to the national party line is higher, either. Third, time the decision is taken. One can argue that MEPs are more likely to vote in line with their European party/political group when the leadership positions have not been allocated yet. In other words, it is difficult to apply the well know rule of ‘stick and carrot if the carrot does no longer exist. ‘Despite frequent criticism of the lack of strength of the EP party groups, it is shown that they achieve relatively high and rising levels of cohesion.However, there is no clear answer on ‘whether it is mainly the transnational or the national parties that act as the principals of the MEPs.At least three observations can be made to show the relations between them. First, ‘national political parties make up the European parties strategically choose to vote together and impose discipline on their MEPs even when their preferences diverge. Doing so, they want to secure their ‘long term collective policy goaland not necessarily ‘the immediate outcome of particular vote.Second, MEPs rarely vote against the European party line. Mostly because a ‘high level of consensus between European political groups and national parties rarely forces them to make that choice. Third however, if the conflict between two principals appears they will chose the national on e. One can say that ‘MEPs are ultimately controlled by their national parties rather than European political groups. Importance of the national actors in determining the cohesion of the European parties depends on ‘how closely [nation parties] follow Parliamentary debates and how often the offer guidance to their own members. The national parties are more likely to be directly involved ‘when they are opposed to the group vote or when the issue is of particular national concern.Voting against the majority within the political group does not simply pay if the rate is not high enough. The same applies for the roll-call voting where votes (Yes, No, Abstain) are published in the parliaments official minutes.Votes that are usually taken by roll call concerns decision of rather political nature (not technical one). It gives an extra incentive to ‘show loyalty to the European political groups. Existing studies of roll-call voting confirm this statement showing that ‘MEPs are likely to vote along transnational party lines than national lineswhen such a method is applied. ‘Though the Parliament is organized

The Constitutional Issue of Abortion :: Argumentative Persuasive Topics

The Constitutional Issue of Abortion Three Works Cited Many people believe abortion is only a moral issue, but it is also a constitutional issue. It is a woman's right to choose what she does with her body, and it should not be altered or influenced by anyone else. This right is guaranteed by the ninth amendment, which contains the right to privacy. The ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." This right guarantees the right to women, if they so choose, to have an abortion, up to the end of the first trimester. Regardless of the fact of morals, a woman has the right to privacy and choice to abort her fetus. The people that hold a "pro-life" view argue that a woman who has an abortion is killing a child. The "pro-choice" perspective holds this is not the case. A fetus is not yet a baby. It does not posses the criteria derived from our understanding of living human beings. In a notable defense of this position, philosopher Mary Anne Warren has proposed the following criteria for "person-hood": 1) consciousness (of objects and events external and or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain. 2) reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems) 3) self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control) 4) the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics. 5) the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or social, or both. (Taking Sides -Volume 3). Several cases have been fought for the right to choose. Many of these have been hard cases with very personal feelings, but the perseverance showed through and gives us the rights we have today. Here are some important cases: 1965 - Griswold v. Connecticut - upheld the right to privacy and ended the ban on birth control. Eight years later, the Supreme Court ruled the right to privacy included abortions. Roe v. Wade was based upon this case. 1973 - Roe v. Wade: - The state of Texas had outlawed abortions. The Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional, but refused to order an injunction against the state. On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court voted the right to privacy included abortions.